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Abstract: The domain of cosmology is the universe, a singular concept, and
basically for this reason cosmology is a science that diﬀers from other sciences. For
a long time there have been critical voices which argue that cosmology cannot
be a proper science on par with, say, nuclear physics or hydrodynamics. This
kind of critique goes a long way back in time, and I review it here in a historical
perspective, focusing on the century from 1870 to 1970. I suggest that there are
no good reasons to deny cosmology the status of a proper science. On the other
hand, I also consider it natural, and a sign of health, that such foundational
questions continue to be part of the cosmological discourse.
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1
During the last ﬁfty years or so, cosmology has developed greatly and is today
recognized to be a mature and fundamental part of the physical sciences. With
the Nobel prizes in physics awarded in 1978 and 2006 to work related to big-
bang cosmology it may seem pointless to argue that cosmology is not a proper
science. After all, it is hard to imagine that Nobel laureates in physics should
earn the prize for doing work that doesn't even qualify as science. It is generally
recognized, often with a considerable measure of self-congratulation, that The
discovery of the cosmic microwave background in the 1960s established the big
bang theory and made cosmology into an empirical science, such as stated in an
article in Scientiﬁc American from 1992 (Brush 1992, p. 62). Even more impres-
sively, cosmology does not any longer rely on observations exclusively but can
boast of having developed into an experimental science, at least as far as early-
universe cosmology is concerned. As two leading particle cosmologists expressed
it: Cosmology has become a true science in the sense that ideas not only are
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developed but also are being tested in the laboratory.... This is a far cry from
earlier eras in which cosmological theories proliferated and there was little way to
conﬁrm or refute any of them other than on their aesthetic appeal (Schramm/
Steigman 1992, p. 66). I am not suggesting that such evaluations are not reason-
able or that cosmology is not a ﬁeld of science; I would rather like to take a look
at the problem from a deeper, and in this case historical, perspective. The basic
question I want to discuss is this: Is it possible at all to establish a science of the
universe, on par with other sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology?  or
is it only possible to deal scientiﬁcally with what is in the universe? These are
clearly big and complicated questions, and I have no ambition to discuss them
fully or come up with answers to them. Being a historian of science, I shall adopt
an empirical or historical approach, rather than an abstract philosophical ap-
proach; and I will do so by examining a few episodes in the history of cosmology
in which foundational issues were discussed and arguments of a philosophical or
extrascientiﬁc kind naturally entered the cosmological arena. It is my belief that
the value of such an approach is not limited to the history of the past, but that
it may also illuminate the current situation in cosmology and perhaps provide
modern cosmologists with a broader perspective as to the nature of their science.
After a brief view at Kant's remarkable but somewhat neglected role in the his-
tory of cosmological thought, I turn to aspects of how thermodynamics inspired
philosophical (and theological) debates of cosmology in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. I shall then proceed with an equally brief account of the philosophical
and meta-physical discussion during the formative period of modern cosmology,
meaning the 1950s. Following some rather scattered remarks concerning cosmol-
ogy's scientiﬁc status, I end with a look at the present uneasiness about whether
cosmology is truly a science. Needless to say, the present account is brief and
sketchy. For details and further literature, I refer to two of my books on the
history of cosmology (Kragh 1996 and Kragh 2006).
2
Cosmology was for a long time closely linked with philosophy, rather than astron-
omy and physics, and we should therefore not be surprised that one of the ﬁrst
and most acute critiques of cosmology as a science came from a philosopher. I am
thinking of the famous philosopher of Königsberg, Immanuel Kant, who in one
of his earliest works, the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels
from 1755, established a grand and evolutionary cosmology purportedly on the
basis of Newtonian mechanics (Kant 1981 and Falkenburg 2000). His qualitative
theory or scenario was at ﬁrst ignored, but in the nineteenth century  and espe-
cially after Helmholtz had called attention to it in a lecture of 1854  it became
widely adopted as a reasonable picture of how the universe had evolved. How-
ever, in the present context it is of more interest that Kant changed his view with
regard to cosmology, and in his famous and highly inﬂuential Kritik der reinen
Vernunft of 1781 concluded that the notions of age and extent are meaningless
when applied to the universe as a whole. The concept of the universe, he argued,
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Figure 1: The original cover of Kant (1981).
is contradictory, and therefore it cannot be an object of possible experience; it
is not something that exists objectively or cover a physical reality, but it is a
regulative principle of merely heuristic value.
Kant's Kritik provided a penetrating analysis of foundational cosmological prob-
lems, but since it was purely philosophical it made little impact on physicists
and astronomers engaged in studying the content and laws of the universe. As-
tronomers were anyway reluctant to take up cosmological research. The general
view in the nineteenth century was that astronomy was strictly an empirical sci-
ence assisted by mathematical calculations; its domain was restricted to what
could be observed, a view which eﬀectively implied an exclusion of cosmology in
the proper sense of the word. In a letter of 1847, Carl Friedrich Gauss referred
scornfully to cosmological hypotheses such as Kant's as Phantasiespiele or plays
of the imagination that should be kept apart from astronomy proper (Peters
186065, vol. 5, p. 394). The attitude didn't change much over the subsequent
decades. In an age of positivism, the general attitude was that theories must be
conﬁned by empirical data, which usually was taken to imply that astronomy was
limited by the Milky Way system and that the possible existence of even more
distant worlds was considered a question of metaphysics rather than physics. As
the great American astronomer Simon Newcomb phrased it in 1907: When there
are no facts to be explained, no theory is required. As there are no observed
facts as to what exists beyond the farthest stars, the mind of the astronomer is
a complete blank on the subject. Popular imagination can ﬁll up the blank as it
pleases (Kragh 2006, p. 111).
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3
This is not to say that cosmology was non-existent in the nineteenth century,
only that it was not taken very seriously by the majority of physicists and as-
tronomers. As a little known example of early physical cosmology I would like
to draw attention to an interesting discussion about the physics of the universe
that took place in the period from about 1870 to 1910 and which was the direct
outcome of the global formulation of the laws of thermodynamics. As stated by
Rudolf Clausius in 1865, the two laws were not only completely general, they
also applied to the world or universe as a whole, that is, they were claimed to
be valid in a cosmological sense. Clausius' canonical formulation of the laws was
as follows: 1. The energy of the universe is constant. 2. The entropy of the
universe tends toward a maximum. William Thomson in Great Britain came
independently to the same conclusion, but preferred to speak of dissipation of
energy rather than entropy.
From an early date it was argued that the second law of thermodynamics leads to
the conclusion that in the course of time the universe will irreversibly approach
a state of equilibrium, corresponding to a maximum entropy; when this state has
been reached, it will be condemned to eternal rest. The message seemed to be
that the world is in a state of decay or degeneration, and there is nothing that
can prevent it from proceeding its suicidal course until its ﬁnal consequence of
a global Götterdämmerung. In addition to this dire prediction of a Wärmetod,
a heat death, it was argued that the law of entropy increase also leads to the
conclusion that the universe must be of ﬁnite age, have had a beginning in time
and thus perhaps have been created. Because, so the argument ran, if the universe
had existed in an eternity, and the second law had always been in operation, the
entropy would by now be at its maximum. This is clearly not the case  after all,
we exist (don't we?)  so the universe cannot have existed in an inﬁnity of time.
Q.e.d.!
These predictions are of dubious validity from a scientiﬁc and logical point of
view, but they are nonetheless interesting because they were truly cosmological
predictions based on an unrestricted extrapolation of the laws of thermodynamics.
Moreover, they became highly controversial elements in the Kulturkampf of the
late nineteenth century that raged between materialists and people of a Chris-
tian orientation. Issues such as the inﬁnity of the universe and the possibility
of counter-entropic processes were intensely discussed by scientists, philosophers,
theologians and social critics, not least in the new Germany where Catholic schol-
ars took them very seriously (Neswald 2006 and Kragh 2004).
What is of relevance in the present context is that the debate also provoked
a critical discussion of the foundation of physical cosmology, and even of the
possibility of speaking scientiﬁcally about the universe. For instance, the famous
Austrian physicist and positivist philosopher Ernst Mach argued in the 1870s that
it was illegitimate to apply the laws of physics to the entire universe, because the
universe is a concept to which no meaningful statements can be attached. His
point was that the universe does not have the status of an object, it is not a thing,
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Figure 2: The dying earth (from Flammarion 1880, p. 5).
but the collection of all things. The whole, he maintained, cannot be treated in
the same way as the parts of which it consists (Mach 1923, pp. 209 f.):
Energy and entropy are concepts of measure. What meaning can
it have to apply these concepts to a case where they are not even
applicable, in which their values are indeterminate? If the entropy of
the world could be determined, it would be an absolute measure of
time and it would be, at best, nothing but a tautology to say that
the entropy of the world increases with time. Time, and the fact that
certain changes take place in a deﬁnite sense, are one and the same
thing.
Many other writers of the late nineteenth century agreed with Mach and asserted
that the universe as a whole cannot possibly be the subject of the laws of physics.
For example, the German-American philosopher John Stallo charged in 1882 that
all cosmogonies which purport to be theories of the universe as an absolute whole,
in the light of physical and dynamical laws, are fundamentally absurd (Stallo
1882, p. 276). Of course, this is precisely what modern cosmologists aim at, to
provide theories of the universe as an absolute whole.
To mention but one more example, also Pierre Duhem in France denied that
physics justiﬁes long-term predictions of a cosmological kind. In an essay of 1905
he argued that, physical theory can never demonstrate or contradict an assertion
of cosmology, for the propositions constituting one of these doctrines can never
bear on the same terms which the propositions forming the other do, and between
two propositions not bearing on the same terms there can be neither agreement
nor contradiction (Duhem 1974, p. 301). The objections of Mach and Duhem
with respect to the scientiﬁc nature of cosmology were in their spirit quite close
to the criticism that Kant had raised in 1781. However, it is uncertain if their
views were inﬂuenced in any direct way by Kant's Kritik. As far as Duhem is
Physics and Philosophy  2007  Id: 008 5
Helge Kragh: The Controversial Universe
concerned, he mostly used the term cosmology in its scholastic or Thomistic
sense, which includes many more aspects than those relating to the physics and
astronomy of the universe.
4
I shall now proceed to the situation in cosmology in the ﬁrst decades after the
relativistic revolution and the discovery of the expansion of the universe. In
the 1930s and 1940s it was generally agreed that cosmology, whether based on
general relativity or not, was in an unsatisfactory state because of the great
gulf between the bewildering wealth of mathematical theories and the poverty of
relevant observations. It seemed to some critics that cosmology was dominated
by a priori principles and rationalistic thinking, and that cosmologists arrogantly
erected ambitious and mathematically arcane theories without caring the least for
observational support. The kind of cosmophysical theories proposed in the 1930s
by Arthur Eddington, Edward A. Milne and Paul Dirac in England caused the
astrophysicist and philosopher Herbert Dingle to launch a sharp attack against
what he saw as a revival of speculative Aristotelianism, only dressed in a nearly
incomprehensible mathematical language. Instead of the induction of principles
from phenomena we are given a pseudo-science of invertebrate cosmythology, he
thundered (Dingle 1937, p. 385).
Dingle's criticism was particularly aimed against Milne's so-called kinematic cos-
mology and its foundation in the cosmological principle, which is the general
claim that the universe is homogeneous and isotropic on a large scale. Although
Dingle's criticism was rather extreme, he was not the only one who sensed the
danger of rationalism in cosmology. Thus, the highly respected British-American
astronomer George McVittie warned in 1940 that some cosmologists  he was
thinking of Milne  are not trying to understand Nature but rather are telling
Nature what she ought to be. If Nature is recalcitrant and refuses to fall in with
their pattern, so much the worse for her (McVittie 1940. p. 280).
Foundational questions often come up in connection with major controversies,
such as they did in the 1950s when relativistic evolution models of the universe
were challenged by an entirely new kind of cosmology, the steady-state theory pro-
posed by Fred Hoyle, Hermann Bondi and Thomas Gold. Among the interesting
features of this famous episode in the history of cosmology is that philosophically
oriented objections and arguments entered prominently in the controversy. While
some of the arguments were speciﬁcally aimed at either the steady-state theory or
the rival class of big-bang theories, others were of a more general kind and ques-
tioned the scientiﬁc legitimacy of cosmology per se, irrespective of the particular
form or model. It was often assumed that the choice between the rival cosmologi-
cal models could not be solved by ordinary scientiﬁc methods, but that there was
wide room for appeal to aesthetical and philosophical preferences. According to
the physicist Martin Johnson, cosmology had more in common with the poetic
and artistic attitude towards experience than with the solely logical (Johnson
1951, p. 420). If the choice necessarily involved such extra-scientiﬁc considera-
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tions and was inevitably inﬂuenced by personal taste, it might seem doubtful if
cosmology was a proper science. After all, de gustibus non est disputandum.
I can only deal with a very few aspects of this interesting and illuminating debate,
and want ﬁrst to mention the exchange of views that took place between Hermann
Bondi and Gerald Whitrow in 1954, in the pages of The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science (Whitrow/Bondi 1954). The subject under discussion was
whether modern cosmology is a science or not. The very fact that this question
could be seriously discussed by two leading cosmologists is a clear indication
that cosmology at the time lacked professional maturity. According to Whitrow,
contemporary cosmology was not truly scientiﬁc, and, moreover, it was unlikely
that it would ever become a science in the ordinary sense. Because, so he argued,
the subject of cosmology is an absolutely unique object, the universe, and this
uniqueness makes cosmology a borderline subject between the special sciences and
philosophy. Whitrow believed it would remain such a borderline semi-science.
He added that cosmology's lack of scientiﬁc character was socially reﬂected in
the lack of consensus among the cosmologists, for agreement about fundamental
standards and methods is a hallmark of any mature science, and there evidently
was no such agreement at the time. To use a Kuhnian terminology, one may say
that cosmology was in a pre-paradigmatic phase, and Whitrow doubted that it
would ever develop into a science with a shared paradigm.
Bondi, on the other hand, took a more optimistic view and argued that cosmol-
ogy was quickly on its way to become a truly scientiﬁc branch of science and that
the situation in cosmology did not diﬀer fundamentally from that in other new
sciences. Certainly, cosmologists disagreed radically about fundamental issues,
but Bondi considered this to be natural for a young science that had not yet
entered a mature phase, and he tended to see it as a sign of health rather than a
weakness. Both Bondi and Gold mentioned philosophical and aesthetical consid-
erations in cosmology and agreed that the importance of such considerations was
a valid indicator of the lack of scientiﬁc character in the sense that whereas the
role of philosophy was reduced to the heuristic level in mature sciences such as
physics and chemistry, it was still of great importance in cosmology. But whereas
Bondi believed that observation and physical theory had now largely replaced phi-
losophy also in cosmology, Whitrow argued that philosophical arguments would
always remain an essential part of the study of the universe.
One reason for Bondi's optimistic belief in the scientiﬁc level of cosmology was
methodological, namely, that in spite of many disagreements there was, so he
claimed, broad agreement with regard to what criteria should be used to settle
controversies. Personal taste and metaphysical commitments such as preference
for simplicity and logical beauty would always play a role, but a ﬁrm basis for
demarcating science from non-science could only be found in the possibility of
experimental disproof, such as highlighted by Karl Popper. Bondi, who was a
faithful Popperian, claimed that there was universal agreement about falsiﬁcation
as a demarcation criterion, and so, by this test, the cardinal test of any science,
modern cosmology must be regarded a science (Whitrow/Bondi 1954, p. 279).
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Discussions about a ﬁeld's scientiﬁc status is not the usual area of scientists, but
rather the business of philosophers, and in the present case there was no shortage
of philosophers willing to enter the debate and tell the cosmologists whether the
universe could be the object of scientiﬁc study. Is cosmology a science like physics
and chemistry? What are the criteria of truth and how do they diﬀer from those
adopted by other sciences? Which of the competing theories is the more scientiﬁc,
and on which grounds?  these were some of the questions eagerly discussed by
both scientists and philosophers in connection with the cosmological controversy
in the 1950s.
Many philosophers were critical in their judgment of cosmology, which they
tended to deny scientiﬁc status. For example, the reputed Argentine physicist-
philosopher Mario Bunge claimed that the steady-state theory was unscientiﬁc
because it involved the notion of continual creation of matter ex nihilo, some-
thing he considered to be characteristically theological or magical (Bunge 1962,
p. 117). The only justiﬁcation for introducing continual creation was (so he
claimed) to save the so-called perfect cosmological principle, that is, the large-
scale uniformity of the universe in time as well as space. This principle, which
formed the conceptual basis of the steady-state theory, Bunge saw as an unjus-
tiﬁed dogma of an a priori nature. His rejection of the steady-state theory as
plainly unscientiﬁc did not imply any sympathy for relativistic big-bang models,
for he argued that any theory that operated with a ﬁnite age of the world was
necessarily non-scientiﬁc because the beginning of the universe is beyond scien-
tiﬁc explanation and can only be accounted for supernaturally. His rejection of
both of the rival world models eﬀectively meant that he denied cosmology the
status of a science.
One of the subjects that (understandably) fascinated philosophers and philosoph-
ically minded scientists in the 1950s was the concept of the age of the universe,
which was of course a central question in the cosmological controversy: according
to the big-bang theory, the age is ﬁnite, while according to the steady-state the-
ory it is inﬁnite. It is symptomatic of the state and reputation of cosmology at
the time, that when the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science announced
a prize essay on this topic in 1953, the ﬁrst prize was awarded to the Ameri-
can philosopher Michael Scriven, who in his essay denied the scientiﬁc validity of
the question. According to Scriven, the notion of a beginning of the universe is
unprovable in principle and therefore outside the power of science to determine.
This was, more or less, the same conclusion that Kant had drawn back in 1781.
The reluctance of philosophers to accept cosmology as a genuine science may
be further illustrated by the views of the two reputed philosophers Rom Harré
and Stephen Toulmin. Harré concluded in 1962 that cosmogony, in the sense
of the study of the origin and evolution of the universe, is not and cannot be
a science because it relies on a ﬁrst event that cannot be identiﬁed by any law
of nature (Harré 1962). A few years later Toulmin/Goodﬁeld (1968) concluded
that Cosmological theory is still basically philosophical (p. 258) and that the
ﬁeld still faced the same objections that were raised by Kant nearly two hundred
years earlier. Toulmin had earlier expressed his doubts about the scientiﬁc nature
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of cosmology by pointing out that when we say that a law is universally valid
it does not mean that it is valid for the universe but for all subsystems of the
universe (Toulmin/Goodﬁeld 1968 and Toulmin 1982). By itself, the fact that a
law is universal implies nothing about the universe as a whole. A statement which
holds universally is one thing, a statement about the universe is another, and
a step from one level to the other will always require justiﬁcation.
It is interesting, given the history of the subject, that Toulmin applied his critique
to the cosmological use of the second law of thermodynamics much in the same
way as Mach and others had done nearly a century earlier. Toulmin shared Mach's
belief that there are no laws of the universe, and that there is no intelligible sense
in which one can apply the law of entropy increase to the universe as a whole.
Even if it is established that the second law can be applied to all physical systems
thermally isolated from the rest of the universe, it follows in no way that it applies
also to the universe  contrary to what Clausius had stated back in the 1860s.
He therefore concluded, as Mach and other late-nineteenth-century philosophers
had done, that the notion of the heat death was scientiﬁcally meaningless. Or,
as he phrased it: The running-down universe is a myth, and we shall discover
about the Apocalypse from physics only what we read into the subject. The
pitfalls surrounding the notion of an Apocalypse surround equally the idea of a
Beginning of All Things (Toulmin 1982, p. 49).
5
I will now like to consider from a more general perspective a few of the problems
that have turned up in this brief and fragmented historical survey. One of the
objections raised against cosmology as a science, both in the 1950s and at later
occasions, is that it rests on certain presuppositions of a metaphysical or a pri-
ori nature, assumptions that cannot possibly be veriﬁed because they cover the
universe in its entirety. I mentioned that some critics, such as Dingle and Bunge,
objected to the cosmological principle either in its restricted spatial form or its
wider spatio-temporal form known as the perfect cosmological principle. But it
is really misleading to characterize these principles as a priori in the standard
sense that their validity is necessary and independent of any experience.
The cosmological principles cannot be veriﬁed, but lack of veriﬁability is hardly
a serious problem as long as they can be falsiﬁed. And they can indeed be falsi-
ﬁed, such as shown most directly by the history of the steady-state theory which
eﬀectively led to the abandonment of the perfect cosmological principle. This
principle is no longer defended by cosmologists, not even by the few who con-
tinue to develop cosmological models inspired by the steady-state theory (such
as the quasi-steady-state model advocated by Jayant Narlikar). The reason why
the steady-state theory was rejected, and hence that the perfect cosmological
principle had to be given up, was basically that the theory was unable to ac-
count for the microwave background and other observations. Far from being an
a priori assumption, the cosmological principle should be looked upon as merely
an idealization or a simplifying assumption of the same type that we know from
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other areas of physics. The lack of veriﬁability is in no way problematic, as it
is a feature the cosmological principle shares with the universal laws of physics
with which the principle is closely connected: the cosmological principle is a hy-
pothesis of global uniformity that implicitly presupposes the same kind of physics
throughout the universe, and hence that the laws of physics are the same in any
distant corner of the universe as we know them from terrestrial experiments.
The universe is in many ways a strange and frightening concept because it in-
cludes everything physical, and this may seem to distinguish cosmology from
other sciences that are characterized by a limited domain. But the distinction
should not be overrated, for in some sense it is not really a problem which is spe-
ciﬁc to cosmological research. Similar problems appear, if typically in a hidden
form, in the ordinary laws of nature in so far these are claimed to be general and
universally valid.
Consider, for example, the law of energy conservation or the law that states that
all electrons have the same electrical charge. These laws are supposed to be
valid throughout the universe, for all processes and for all electrons, even though
there may be an inﬁnity of them. A referent such as all electrons is unique and
implicitly cosmological since it means all electrons in the universe. Similarly,
the law of energy conservation refers to all processes in the universe, anywhere
and at any time. The implicit cosmological nature of much standard physics
may be further exempliﬁed by the existential statements that often appear in
physics. When a particle physicist claims that a certain entity exists, and claims
no more than that, it means that at least one instance of the predicted entity
exists somewhere in the universe. Such a statement may evidently be veriﬁed,
but it cannot be falsiﬁed (as Popper was well aware of).
From a realist point of view it is tempting to argue from the scientiﬁc success
of modern cosmology that its domain  the universe  must exist independently
of cosmological theory. On the other hand, the anti-realist will tend to conceive
the universe as merely an idea or a mental reconstruction that only exists as a
reﬂection of current cosmological theory. The universality of some laws of nature,
mentioned above, is not by itself a convincing argument in favor of cosmological
realism, cp. Toulmin's critical comments. Still, the universe is not just an idea.
As Ernan McMullin has pointed out, ideas do not possess physical properties
such as mass, volume and space curvature (McMullin 1981). Moreover, modern
cosmology operates with measurable quantities that are not only in the universe
but are truly cosmological in nature. The ubiquitous microwave background
radiation is the best known example, while another example is furnished by the
cosmological constant and the dark energy assumedly associated with it. These
quantities do not relate to particular points of space-time, but are characteristics
for the universe at large.
The physical sciences are nomological in the sense that phenomena are typically
explained by subsuming them under covering laws. Such nomological or law-based
explanations presuppose that the objects whose properties are to be explained
are members of a class. For instance, if we want to know why Jupiter moves
around the Sun in an elliptic orbit we may refer to Kepler's ﬁrst law and the fact
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that Jupiter is a planet  or, on a deeper level we may wish to refer to Newton's
law of gravitation or to Einstein's general theory of relativity. But in this respect
the universe is diﬀerent, since it is unique and therefore the only member of
its class. It may seem to follow that whereas one can distinguish between law-
bound and contingent properties in local physics, this is not possible in cosmology.
Bondi, who considered cosmology to be necessarily phenomenological, expressed
the diﬀerence as follows: We have got to take the motion of the universe, and
not its law of motion. It is boring to describe separately the motion of the apple
and of the moon and so on. But if there is nothing but one apple falling, then
you would be silly if you did anything but describe that motion (Bondi 1967, p.
82).
However, even if we accept that nomological explanations have no place in cos-
mology, it does not mean that cosmology is bound to be descriptive rather than
explanatory. After all, there are other types of explanation than the deductive-
nomological one based on a covering law of the Hempel-Popper type. For exam-
ple, consider the question, why is space ﬁlled with a cold and uniform microwave
radiation? Such a question cannot be explained nomologically, but it can be
explained genetically, in a way similar to which some facts of biology and geology
are explained. A genetical explanation involves a scenario of how the phenomenon
came into existence as a result of earlier phenomena. The favored answer to the
question is because the universe started in a big bang some 13 billion years ago,
which is an explanation that of course involves laws of physics but not laws of
the universe.
Altogether I ﬁnd the epistemic pessimism that many philosophers and scien-
tists expressed half a century ago to be exaggerated and misleading. Although
one may question the scientiﬁc nature of certain cosmological theories, there is
no good reason to conclude that cosmology as such is non-scientiﬁc or entirely
diﬀerent from other sciences with a more limited domain. The very history of
modern cosmology seems to conﬁrm this, for the way cosmological theories have
been evaluated by means of theoretical arguments and observational testing is
essentially the same that we ﬁnd in other branches of the physical sciences.
6
One might believe that the kind of problems I have alluded to, and presented
in a historical context, are no longer of relevance after cosmology has become
a mature and progressive science and the hot big-bang paradigm accepted by
almost all cosmologists. But this is not quite the case, and fortunately so. There
are still scientists and philosophers who doubt if cosmology is a proper science or,
more commonly, object to the scientiﬁc status of particular cosmological theories,
especially those that relate to the very early universe or other esoteric parts of
cosmology. Examples may be models with varying constants of nature or, more
typically, quantum cosmologies such as many-world models, pre-big-bang theories
and models of the Hartle-Hawking type. The skeptics typically argue that it is
nearly impossible to distinguish between mathematical models and theories of
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physical reality, and they complain that some cosmological theories are practically
beyond empirical testing and therefore not truly scientiﬁc. I shall not enter this
more recent discussion except that I ﬁnd it relevant to point out the historical
continuity, the similarity in spirit between the more recent criticism and the one
that was aired in the period before big-bang standard cosmology.
To illustrate my point, let me end by quoting a couple of examples of fairly recent
criticism, due to scientists rather than philosophers. Not so many years after
the inﬂation scenario had become fashionable, Georges Ellis and Tony Rothman
wrote an article entitled Has Cosmology Become Metaphysical? and in this
article they stated (Rothman/Ellis 1987, p. 22):
A peculiar situation has arisen in cosmology. . . . This [inﬂation] the-
ory has no evidence to support it, and the one prediction it does make
appears to be incorrect. It is too early to make a conclusive judgment
on inﬂation, which is, without argument, aesthetically pleasing. But
there also can be no argument that cosmology is approaching the
frontier where science is no longer based on experimental evidence
and makes no testable predictions. Once this border is crossed, we
have left the world of physics behind and have entered the realm of
metaphysics.
Other critics have objected that the inﬂation theory has spawned a research
program that has the potential to insulate itself almost completely from empirical
falsiﬁcation (Rhook/Zangari 1994, p. 228).
The journal General Relativity and Gravitation carried in the year 2000 an article
by M. J. Disney, a British astronomer, which repeated many of the accusations of
earlier critics, not only in substance but also in rhetoric (Disney 2000 with reply
in irkovi¢ 2002). Disney's basic concern was the gulf between observation and
theory, and also the cosmologists' unrestrained willingness to extrapolate known
physics over huge ranges in space and time. Cold dark matter, a notion accepted
by the majority of cosmologists, sounded to Disney like a religious liturgy which
its adherents chant like a mantra in the mindless hope that it will spring into
existence.
The comparison between cosmology and religion was far from new, and it was
not accidental: The most unhealthy aspect of cosmology is its unspoken parallel
with religion. Both deal with big but probably unanswerable questions. The rapt
audience, the media exposure, the big book-sale, tempt priests and rogues, as well
as the gullible, like no other subject in science. Indeed, the claimed association
between cosmology and religion is as old as, or even older than, the accusation
that cosmology does not live up to the normal standards of science. And there
are those who believe that the two problems go hand in hand, that a science
cannot be truly scientiﬁc if it invites religious feelings or otherwise approaches
domains that traditionally belong to religion and spiritual life. But this is, as so
much else, another story.
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